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Work, Risk and Health: 
Differences between Immigrants and Natives in Spain
* 
 
We analyze the impact of working and contractual conditions, particularly exposure to job 
risks, on the probability of acquiring a disability. We postulate a model in which this impact is 
mediated by the choice of occupation, with a level of risk associated to it. We assume this 
choice is endogenous, and that it depends on preferences and opportunities in the labour 
market, both of which may differ between immigrants and natives. To test this hypothesis we 
use data from the Continuous Sample of Working Lives of the Spanish SS system. It contains 
individual, job and firm information of over a million workers, including a representative 
sample of immigrants. We find that risk exposure increases the probability of permanent 
disability by 5.3%; temporary employment also influences health. Migrant status – with 
differences among regions of origin – significantly affects both disability and the probability of 
being employed in a risky occupation. Most groups of immigrants work in riskier jobs, but 
have lower probability of becoming disabled. Nevertheless, our theoretical hypothesis that 
disability and risk are jointly determined is not valid for immigrants: i.e. for them working 
conditions is not a matter of choice in terms of health. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Numerous investigations have demonstrated that working conditions have an impact on health 
(Llena-Nozal et al, 2004; Robone et al, 2010; Bartley et al 2004; Benach et al 2004; Moden, 
2005). In particular, the exposure to work related risk of injury and illness has an expected 
reflect on ill health (Berger and Leigh, 1989). Many of those investigations apply an equity 
lens to demonstrate a link between the unequal distribution of working conditions and 
inequalities in health (Artazcoz et al 2005; Warren et al, 2004, Borg and Kristensen, 2000; 
Power et al 1998; Lundberg, 1991). But not only material working conditions are likely to 
have an impact on health and permanent disability, psychological factors related to lack of 
autonomy at work, job dissatisfaction and contractual conditions that affect job stability have 
also appeared in several studies as strong determinants of general health or specific diseases 
(Gash et al 2007; Datta Gupta and Kristensen 2007; Marmot, 2005; Virtanen et al, 2005; 
Pikhart et al 2004; Smith et al 1995).  
 
Conceiving health as a dynamic concept, it is plausible that working conditions and work 
environment affect both the gradual changes in health and the occurrence of events that have a 
sudden impact on individual’s health, like work-related accidents. This approach is stressed in 
Kerkhofs and Lindeboom, 1997 and it stands at the basis of the present investigation. In their 
model, these authors assume that health status and labour market outcomes may be jointly 
determined. Individuals with low time discount rates may be more likely to invest in future 
labour market positions and health than those with higher discount rates.  
 
Following this line, our starting notion is that the relationship between working conditions 
and health is mediated by the occupational choice in terms of risk.  It is plausible to assume   3
that on choosing a job –with a level of risk associated to it- workers do not ignore the effects 
of working in a risky job on their health status
1. The idea that individuals invest in their own 
health has an outstanding place in the literature since the publication of Grossman seminal 
work (1972), and the treatment of occupational choice as an investment in health can be 
found, for example, in Cropper (1977). On the other hand, the choice of work related risk 
level is partially determined by taste and economic circumstances. Among them, migrant 
status is supposed to strongly affect the occupational choice and, at the same time, contribute 
to determine health outcomes. Several researchers have documented differences in workplace 
risk exposures by country of origin or race within a broader discussion on the role of tastes 
and market opportunities in assuming a certain level of risk at work (Viscusi, 2003, Leeth and 
Ruser, 2006). Under a health investment framework, differences in health investments by 
migrant status are thus assumed. 
 
This research uses a dataset containing ample information about working lives and disability 
status to explore two sets of issues. First, what is the contribution of working and contractual 
conditions, and particularly the exposure to health risks, to the probability of acquiring a 
disability, taking into account the endogeneity of risk level choices? Second, are immigrants 
and natives significantly different in terms of risk choices and in the effect of these choices on 
their health status? Moreover, are all immigrants the same? The existence of socioeconomic 
health inequalities due to differences in working conditions constitutes itself a focus of 
interest of public policies. Possible differences in market opportunities by country of origin 
conducing immigrants to higher risk exposure or more precarious employment constitute an 
                                                 
1 The importance of taking into account endogeneity has been illustrated in Haveman et al (1994) who 
use Grossman’s framework to address the question of the interdependency of health status, work-time 
and wages where work-time beyond some norm is supposed to entail stress and other deleterious side 
effects. They demonstrate that the simultaneous GMM estimations differ substantially from those 
derived from simpler models with more restrictive assumptions commonly used in the literature.   4
additional source of inequality and are in the basis of the debate on the conditions in which a 
society integrates the new arrivals.  
 
Due to the recent dramatic growth in the  immigrant population in Spain
2, the above-
mentioned issues stand out as a very important topic of public debate. Despite the magnitude 
of the immigration phenomenon and the political interest on it, the evidence about health 
status and workplace conditions of immigrant populations in Spain and other developed 
countries is still scarce. Furthermore, the existing evidence is based on subjective perceptions 
of both working conditions and health status, or restricted to differences by country of origin 
in workplace illness and injury rates. This paper seeks to contribute to the quality of the 
discussion by applying a behavioural model using objective measures of working conditions 
and disability status obtained from the Social Security census of working lives.   
 
One would expect there to be differences in health investments related to occupational choice 
between immigrants and non-immigrants for different reasons. First, from the hedonic 
equilibrium framework perspective, differences in risk preferences fully explain discrepancies 
in workplace risk across demographic groups. Differences in wage-risk tradeoffs by country 
of origin may arise from unequal economic circumstances or from differences in tastes. For 
instance, inequalities in lifetime levels of wealth -supposed to be lower for immigrants- may 
explain differences in willingness to bear risk, i.e. immigrants or ethnic minorities would be 
more likely to be employed in risky jobs (Viscusi, 2003; Lucas, 1974; Robinson, 1984). 
Second, immigrant and non-immigrants might differ in terms of market opportunities. It is 
known that differences in market offer curve of wages as function of fatality risk by country 
                                                 
2 In 2009, 13.8% of the population had been born abroad, while the percentage was only 3.13% in 
1999.   5
of origin may arise from discrimination or from unmeasured productivity differences 
(Akhavan, 2006; Leeth and Ruser, 2006). In this respect, literature on market discrimination 
documents that immigrants are paid less for the same job (Viscusi, 2003). Other factors 
different from preferences may explain divergencies in risk levels between immigrants and 
non-immigrants if some hypotheses behind the hedonic equilibrium theory are unrealistic. 
Informational disadvantages or occupational crowding probably force immigrants to choose 
higher levels of risk than those arising from their preferences. 
 
For Spain, Ahonen and Benavides (2006) not only find that immigrants are employed in 
riskier jobs than native-born Spaniards, they also show that they experiment more work 
related injuries and diseases than do natives. A similar finding appears in Parra et al (2006) 
for the region of Navarra. Finally, immigrants’ rate of accidents has been reported to be about 
twice that of natives in Germany, France and the Netherlands (Bollini and Siem, 1995). 
 
After this introduction, in the next section we discuss the conceptual and empirical 
frameworks. In section three we describe the institutional context and the data, and we present 
the variables and their descriptive statistics. Section four contains the econometric results, and 
section five concludes with a discussion of the main results and some limitations. 
 
2. Methodological framework 
 
2.1. Conceptual framework 
 
We aim to model two simple facts that are in the basis of our analysis: health depends on   6
working and contractual conditions, mainly through the exposure to work related health risks; 
and the occupational choice that determines the level of risk depends on preferences and 
opportunities in the labour market that may differ between immigrants and natives. 
 
The worker health stock (H) is governed by a health production function where the health 
stock depreciates at rate δ, and L represents a stochastic and permanent shock
3: 
 
Hi = H  i −δHi −Li




where Ri = the level of risk associated to a job (injury and illness rate)  chosen by worker i,  
C = other working conditions,  Ai= worker’s ability to produce safety at work, and  Xi = other 
individual’s variables shaping the adoption of health risks.   
 
 
Let WRi be the expected wage of worker i in a job with risk R and WGi the corresponding 








                                                 




Following previous studies (Daniel and Sofer, 1998) Mi can be interpreted as i´s reservation 
relative wage or as the relative shadow prize for risky working conditions, and therefore 
related to individual’s risk preferences. In other words, in a utility function that depends on 
health and wages, Mi is the MRS between safety and salary. Wi represents the expected wage 
premium for risk (if existing), or simply the difference, in terms of wage, between working in 
a risky job and  i´s alternative in the labour market. Particularly, our model allows for WGi to 
be 0 in the presence of unemployment. Being an immigrant may affect both Mi and Wi. 
Migrant decision might reflect itself certain risk tolerance, so that Mi  can be smaller for 
immigrants than for natives. Leigh (1989) argues that blacks and others who have been reared 
in relative poverty have less aversion to risk than whites that come from predominantly 
middle to upper-income families. With respect to Wi, our hypothesis is that the probability of 
choosing a better job without risk (WGi not being 0) and the compensating wage premium for 
risk is lower for immigrants
4. They face different hedonic wages than natives and, therefore, 
might choose different levels of risk. This leads to a situation in which immigrants and natives 
face different levels of risk and the determinants of risk level choices have a differential 
incidence between these two groups:  
 
R1i = βX i + εi
R2i = αX i + µi
 
 
where 1=immigrant and 2=native and the vector Xi   covers all personal characteristics 
affecting the choice of risk level. R1i and R2i, the risk level choices, are not only the result of 
                                                 
4 The compensating wage premium represents, in fact, any type of compensation that labour 
markets offer that is different for immigrants and natives. In an economy with a large 
underground sector the compensation could be, for instance, a legal contract giving rise to 
legal resident status and social security benefits. 
(
(  8
individuals’ acceptance of risk ( Mi) but are also related to  i W , the wage premium for risk. In 
this respect, the components of vectors R1i and R2i express each level of risk associated to a 
marginal price that results from the intersections of demand and supply functions of workers 
and firms choosing those particular job risks
5. The formulation presented in equation (3.1) 
and (3.2) is appropriate to empirically account for the sorting of workers into levels of risk 
underlying personal characteristics. 
  
 
2.2. Empirical framework 
 
Our model consists of a recursive system of equations for disability and risk exposure, where 
the random component of the disability equation is allowed to be freely correlated with the 
random component of the risk equation. This specification is able to take into account 
endogeneity, which may arise from both simultaneity and unobservable heterogeneity 
influencing both disability and risk exposure. Simultaneity issues may emerge from the fact 
that individuals do not ignore the consequences in terms of health of their risk level choices. 
This consideration is fully consistent with our conceptual framework, where risk choice is 
inserted in a health production function.  
 
To properly account for endogeneity, and considering that both disability and risk are 
dichotomous variables, we specify a bivariate probit model (Greene, 1998) of the following 
form: 
 
                                                 
5 See Thaler and Rosen (1976) for a theoretical analysis of the effect of personal 




* = β1Xi +δRi +εi
Di =1 if Di
* > 0
Ri
* = β2Xi + γZi + µi




for individual i, the  
*
i D  and 
*
i R   are unobserved latent variables indicating individual’s 
probability of acquiring a disability and individual’s propensity to choose a risky job, 
respectively. The vector Xi, contains the explanatory variables of disability. Zi is a vector of 
variables that influence current risk level choice but are uncorrelated with εi; the remaining 
terms in equations (4.1) and (4.2) are the unknown parameters of interest that we wish to 
estimate, 1 β ,  2 β δ and γ, the random error terms, εi and µi.The correlation between εi and µi 
,ρ , will be also estimated,  assuming that it follows a bivarate normal distribution. 
 
The unobserved propensities 
*
i D  and 
*
i R   specified in the system of equations will be 
estimated first for the whole sample, with migrant status as a dummy variable;  we then 
introduce some interactions taking into account the region of origin and, finally, we estimate 
the bivariate probit separately for native-born Spaniards and immigrants distinguishing among 
different regions of origin of those immigrants. 
 
3. Institutional Framework and Data 
3.1 Institutional context 
 
The labour market based social security is mandatory for workers in Spain. Contributions 
(around 37% of calculated monthly earnings) are scaled according to occupational category. 
(5.
(5.2  10
Employers contribute approximately 85% of the total amount and employees the remaining 
15%. The Social Security system provides the most important welfare program in Spain:  
public pensions. As far as permanent disability pensions are concerned, the  law distinguishes 
four levels characterized by increasing severity (the first two are compatible with holding a 
job): 1) partial-permanent disability for the usual profession, refers to disability cases where 
worker's ability to perform his/her usual tasks is decreased by 33% or more 2) total 
permanent disability for the usual profession, 3) absolute permanent disability, applies to  
cases were the individual is unable to do any kind of job and 4) severe disability, the person 
requires  continued attendance by other persons in order to carry out the basic daily activities 
(Jiménez-Martín et al, 2006). In terms of requirements, when the disability is caused by an 
ordinary illness, eligibility to a pension requires a minimum of five years of contributions. 
There is no requirement when the disability is caused by an accident,-whether work-related or 
not- or a professional illness. 
 
3.2. Data and Variables 
 
We use the Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL), 2006, (Continuous Sample of 
Working Lives), an administrative data set provided by the Social Security Administration 
with information on individuals who had an active record with the Social Security system at 
any time during 2006. The sample is a 4% non-stratified random draw from a reference 
population that includes employed workers (wage earners and self-employed), unemployment 
benefits recipients and pensioners. It consists of nearly 1.1 million individuals. The MCVL 
contains information on the employment and contribution history (dating back to 1967) of the 
selected individuals.     11
 
Individual variables include sex, date and place of birth, family status, monthly earnings, 
pension benefits, disability degree and the year of its commencement. Firm characteristics 
comprise number of employees, foundation date and geographical location. Job characteristics 
cover type of contract, tenure, social security scheme, firm’s sector of activity and dates of 
beginning and end of each contract. Job and firm characteristics are registered for each 
contractual relation the worker has been involved in. 
 
The MCVL has two characteristics especially relevant for our analysis: it contains a large and 
representative subsample of immigrants and information about disability and its degree. An 
immigrant is defined as someone who was born abroad. We work with cross section data: any 
relation with the Social Security prevailing in 2006 in the case of the active non-disable 
population and the relationship applicable when the disability appeared in the case of disabled 
people receiving a pension. Since every labour relation generates a new record that means we 
can observe the actual working conditions prevailing when the disability occurred. From the 
original data set, we have restricted our sample to working age (16 to 64) individuals who 
have contributed at least five years to the social security system, the minimum required to be 




The first endogeneous variable is “Disability”, a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the 
person moves to a permanent disability status (any of the four categories mentioned above) at 
any time of his/her active working life and 0 otherwise. The information comes from the   12
administrative records contained in the MCVL. Our data allows identifying transitions to 
disability in two ways: if the individual starts receiving a disability benefit from the Social 
Security System or if the employer starts declaring workers disability (there are incentives –
reduced contributions to the Social Security- to declare the disability). Both can occur 
simultaneously. For disabled individuals, the working conditions considered are those 





We have constructed the risk measure using injury and illness rates by industry-occupation: 
i.e. number of individuals receiving a pension for non-fatal
6   work-related injuries or 
professional illness in a certain industry-occupation divided by the total number of individuals 
working in that industry-occupation. There are 44 industries and 10 occupations, which 
provides a total of 440 job-industry cells. The risk variable takes the value 1 if the job-
industry cell the individual belongs to is in the top quartile in the illness/injury rate ranking, 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
Our risk measure satisfies two important conditions. First, it is narrowly defined in order to 
capture the variation in risk by both occupation and industry at a high level of detail. Second, 
it is elaborated following the same classification of industries and occupations used to define 
the rest of working conditions -both based on the MCVL-, what guaranties coherence. Other 
sources of information that directly provide work-related injury and illness rates not requiring 
                                                 
6 Our investigation excludes fatal injury rates as measure of risk. Since we investigate disability status -our sample only contains 
individuals who are alive- nonfatal rates are more suitable to capture the effects of risk on disability status.   13
further elaborations (for example, the statistics published by the Ministry of Labour and 
Migrations) do not use the same occupational categories as those considered in the MCVL.  
 
Table 1 presents the non-fatal injury and illness rates by major industry-occupation cells. 
Studies that employ simultaneously occupation and industry to estimate risks are rare in the 
Spanish context. Riera and Font (2007) used 8 industries and 9 occupations to estimate a 
hedonic wage function. Lopez-Jacob et al (2008) in comparing immigrants and autochthones 
injury and illness rates used 10 industries (occupations were not considered). Nevertheless, 
our results are consistent with theirs, despite the fact that the terms of comparison are not 
exact. Higher skilled occupations –engineers and university degree graduates, senior 
managers and engineering technicians and assistants with a university degree- have the lowest 
injury and illness rates
7. The highest incidence of work related injuries and illness is found 
among workers in low-skilled job categories of mining and quarrying (25,675 disabled per 
100,000 workers). It is worth mentioning that we consider risk level as a characteristic 
intrinsic to the job and as such it is observed by the worker.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
Explanatory variables   
 
In the disability equation we include both individual characteristics -age, sex, education, 
number of family members, and marital status- and working conditions: days since the first 
affiliation, type of contract, a dummy variable for low skilled jobs, and risk exposure. The 
                                                 
7 Although a university degree is necessary to belong to these two occupational groups, there can be 
people with a university degree in other categories. Occupation is not a worker’s attribute but reflect 
the contractual relation with the employer, contributing to define the tasks involved.   14
variable “type of contract” takes the value 1 for temporary and fixed-term contracts, and 0 for 
civil servants and other kinds of permanent workers. Following the classification published by 
the Spanish Ministry of Labour we consider “low skilled” workers employed as subordinated 
and low skilled labourers. This variable is used as a proxy for lack of autonomy on the job. 
 
We believe that individual’s characteristics also influence the choice of risk level; in 
particular, “number of family members” and “marital status” have been used in some studies 
as proxies for risk preferences (Leeth and Ruser, 2006). The risk equation also contains a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 for workers whose previous working status was 
“unemployed”, and therefore moved from unemployment to the current  job
8 . Being 
unemployed when the occupational decision takes place may influence the choice of job 
characteristics, and particularly the level of risk. Crowded occupations or lack of worker’s 
bargaining power are natural correlates of unemployment status and delimit worker’s set of 
opportunities in the job market. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect shifts from 
unemployment to risky jobs to be more likely than transitions from other jobs to risky 
occupations, everything else equal. On the other hand, if risk preferences fully account for 
differences in risk level choices -as predicted by the hedonic equilibrium theory-, workers in a 
disadvantaged situation (as unemployment) would not be more likely than others to be 
employed in risky occupations. Control variables for firm characteristics are also considered 
in the risk equation: size (number of employees), and years since foundation. Findings from 
industrial safety literature indicate that firm size and accident rates are strongly correlated. Oi 
(1974) found an inverted U shape with its peak accident rate for firms with 160 workers. The 
number of employees appears positively related to safety practices in Thomason (2002).  
                                                 
8 The job performed in 2006 or, in the case of disable people, the job held in the moment of 




Table 2 shows that the proportion of immigrants that have made the transition to a permanent 
disability (2.4%) is lower than that of natives (5.5%). On average, immigrants exhibit a higher 
educational attainment than natives. The percentages of immigrants with secondary (33.8%) 
or university (8.9%) studies are larger than those for natives (29.3% and 5.9%), what seems to 
be contradictory with the higher representation of immigrants in the worst working 
conditions.
9 Immigrants have higher rates of unemployment and temporary employment, and 
are found more often than natives in low-skilled jobs. More telling for our analysis is the fact 
that immigrants are more likely to be employed in risky jobs: 36 % of immigrants are exposed 
to work related risks, while this proportion is 26% for natives. When the three potentially 
“unhealthy” working conditions – temporary employment, risk, and lack of autonomy at work 
(low-skilled jobs)- are jointly considered, the proportion of immigrants employed in 
temporary, low skilled and risky jobs is nearly three times that of native-born Spaniards. This 
finding reinforces the violation of the expected positive relation between high education 
attainment and good working conditions and is consistent with previous studies that show a 
higher incidence of overeducation among immigrant population in Spain (Fernández and 
Ortega 2008; Díaz-Serrano 2010).  
  
Persons born in the US, Canada, China and EU-15 are the least likely to be found in risky 
occupations. At the other extreme, Latin America, Portugal, Eastern Europe and Africa are the 
countries/regions of origin associated to higher percentages of risky jobs. This preliminary 
                                                 
9 However, this finding is also observed in Diaz-Serrano (2010), who used a health survey from Catalonia.   16
analysis suggests an opposite relation between country’s level of wealth and risk exposure. 
However, two observations break this link: Portugal is associated to high levels of risk 
contrasting to other EU-15 members, and citizens born in China and other Asian countries 
hardly participate in risky occupations.  
 
Summarizing, and as far as the comparison between immigrants and native-born Spaniards is 
concerned, three intuitions can be obtained from this preliminary analysis: immigrants have 
better education and are less likely to be disabled; however, they are more likely to be 
employed in risky jobs, and risky jobs seem to be associated to higher disability rates
10. In the 
econometric analysis we will try to disentangle this puzzle by exploring the effect of working 
conditions on disability for both immigrants and native-born Spaniards. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
4. Econometric results 
 
Table 3 contains two models with the estimation results of the recursive bivariate probit for 
the whole sample. In the first model, immigrant status is captured by single dummy variable; 
in the second model we include several regional dummies and their interactions with the risk 
variable.   Separate estimations by region of origin are shown in table 4. In order to allow for 
comparisons we report the marginal effects instead of the estimated coefficients.  
 
                                                 
10 In our data, workers employed in risky jobs represent 29% of all workers and accumulate 40% of 
all cases of disability, which suggests that exposure to work related health risks strongly influences the 
probability of becoming disabled.   17
To formally test the null hypothesis of exogenous risk choice, we employed the Hausman-Wu 
test (Hausman, 1978). This test entails a χ
2 test of the explanatory power of the residuals 
from the first-stage risk choice equation when added to the second-stage disability equation. 
The exogeneity of risk choice was rejected ( p < 0.05) in all models. 
 
Migrant status significantly affects both disability status and the probability of being 
employed in a risky occupation. Immigrants have better health –measured by permanent 
disability -but are employed more likely than natives in risky jobs. The impact of our key 
variable, risk exposure, is strong and significant when the whole sample is considered. 
Workers employed in risky jobs increase their probability of becoming disabled by 5.3%. 
Moreover, all the marginal effects associated to working conditions are significant and large, 
in fact, larger than those of other relevant variables such as education. University studies 
reduce the probability of becoming disabled by 1.3% with respect to a person without studies, 
while being employed in a temporary job compared to an indefinite contract increases that 
probability by 2.4%.  
 
The second model highlights the differential effect of risk on disability depending on the 
region of origin. The interactions of risk exposure with the regional dummies are all negative; 
this implies that with respect to natives, immigrants exposed to risky working conditions are, 
on average, less likely to become permanently disabled. Nevertheless, the coefficients are not 
significant for those born in EU-15, the US, Canada and Asia, implying no differences with 
natives.  
   18
The estimations regarding the determinants of risk also provide interesting results. We can 
distinguish three groups of countries. The first and most numerous is composed of African, 
Latin American and European non-EU countries, with positive and large marginal effects. 
European non-EU countries show the highest marginal effect (0.16, in absolute value). The 
second group is made up of people from China and other Asian countries, actually less likely 
to be exposed to work-related risks than natives. Finally, those born in the EU-15, the US and 
Canada are not significantly different from natives with regard to work related risk choices.  
 
Table 4, which contains the results of the model estimated separately for each region of 
origin, shows that ρ is significantly different from 0 only for Spain. This result may arise 
from two possible sources of endogeneity: unobserved factor(s) that influences both the 
probability of becoming disabled and the probability of work risk exposure, or the joint 
determination of disability and risk. As a consequence, a univariate probit will produce biased 
estimates of the impact of risk exposure. For the rest of countries, the non- significance of ρ, 
indicates that both univaritate probit and bivariate probit estimations will yield the same 
empirical results.  
 
Examination of the determinants of risk suggests a number of comments. For all the regions 
of origin, almost all the variables exert a significant effect. Age presents mixed results. It 
appears to be significant only for natives, Latin American and European non-EU15, with 
opposite effects for natives and immigrants. Older natives are less likely to be employed in 
risky jobs while the reverse is true for immigrants. It may reflect that immigrants are less 
likely to shift to better working conditions than natives, and consequently remain in risky jobs 
for a longer time. On the other hand, women are less likely to assume work related risks than   19
men in all of the regions, but this difference is higher in the case of the African and the non-
EU15 immigrants. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3  
 
The probability of working in a risky job decreases in general as educational attainment 
increases. The negative effect of secondary education is bigger for natives than for 
immigrants. To have university studies implies a big decline in the probability of working in a 
risky job (between 10% and 20%) with the highest effect being that of African immigrants.  
 
Time since the first affiliation exerts a negative and significant effect on the probability of 
being employed in a risky job for all the groups of immigrants, except for Africans and for the 
group of EU-15, American and Canadian immigrants. By contrast, risky jobs are more likely 
found among natives with longer work trajectories. The reasons that explain the lack of effect 
of this variable may not be the same for Africans as for those born in the richer countries. For 
African immigrants it may indicate that they do not tend to assimilate to natives, which could 
be linked to reasons of skill transferability, language proficiency and/or labour market 
discrimination. The existence of an occupational attainment gap and the lack of an 
assimilation pattern for Africans are documented in previous studies (Amuedo and de la Rica, 
2007). Immigrants born in rich countries do not differ from natives in terms of risk level 
choices (see table 3) and the non-significance of the time since first affiliation may simply 
indicate that the likeness to natives remains.  
   20
Marital status reduces native’s probability of being employed in a risky job and has no effect 
on immigrants, except for a slight increase in the case of Asians. The results regarding the 
number of family members differ more: it shows a negative impact for natives and a positive 
one for the rest of regions, except for Africans and Asians. Since these variables are plausible 
indicators of risk preferences (as in Leeth and Ruser, 2006), this result may reflect that tastes 
play a less important role on determining risk level choices in the case of immigrants. Finally, 
the transit from unemployment to a risky job is more likely than the transit from a safer job to 
a risky job for all the groups except for Asian and European non-EU15. The impact is 
especially large for people coming from Africa and Latin America.  
 
Regarding the disability equation, we observe that risk exposure notably increases the 
probability of becoming disabled in the case of natives, Africa, Latin America and the group 
of rich countries (EU-15, US and Canada): a 5% increase for natives and increases of around 
1% for the rest are found. The rest of variables defining working conditions exhibit similar 
results: are irrelevant for Asian and European non-EU15 and have a strong effect on disability 
in the rest of countries. Interestingly, the effects of working conditions are, in general, higher 
for native-born Spaniards than for immigrants.  
 
Educational attainment has the expected negative effect on the probability of becoming 
disabled for native-born Spaniards and those born in EU-15, the US and Canada. However, it 
has turned out to be statistically non-significant for immigrants (except secondary education 
for Africans). This finding is consistent with investigations indicating that, compared to 
natives, immigrants face a higher incidence of overeducation (Fernández and Ortega, 2007). 
Another interesting finding is the smaller magnitude of the effect compared to working   21
conditions. Holding a temporary contract has twice the effect of having a university degree. 
This ratio is 5 to 1 when risk exposure and university education are compared. 
 
Age exerts the expected effect for all the groups: it significantly increases the probability of 
acquiring a permanent disability, especially among natives. Women have higher probabilities 
of disability only in the case natives and African, these with a 10% level of significance. 
Being married increases the probability of disability only for Africans, but decreases this 
probability in the case of natives.  
 
Some of the most telling results are those related to years since the first affiliation. Being this 
a proxy for time since arrival in Spain, its behaviour helps to understand the assimilation 
patterns of immigrants. For all the regions of origin except for Asian and European non-
EU15, this variable appears to be relevant to explain (increase) the probability of becoming 
disabled. This result is coherent with the “healthy migrant effect”: those more likely to 
migrate are the healthier, but immigrants’ health tends to assimilate to that of natives if they 
are exposed to similar or worst conditions, everything else equal.  
INSERT TABLE 4 
5. Discussion 
 
Our study is an effort to assess the different role of working and contractual conditions, 
particularly risk exposure, on determining the probability of acquiring a permanent disability 
for immigrants and natives. Our paper differs from previous literature in various ways. First, 
it is based on an objective measure of health rather than the commonly used indicators of self-
perceived health. Second, we analyse differences by region of origin, what is uncommon for   22
Spanish studies. Third, our investigation tries to capture the determinants of the occupational 
choice to better understand the factors behind differences in health outcomes. In our 
estimations, we account for possible endogeneity of risk exposure on the disability equation.  
 
We unambiguously determine that working conditions have an impact on health for natives 
and the most numerous communities of immigrants. Risk exposure is, as expected, an 
important factor to account for differences in disability. The big magnitude of its effect 
compared to other traditional determinants of health such as education is one of our most 
interesting findings. Moreover, the results regarding the strong impact of temporary 
employment on disability deserve further comments. As we mentioned in the introduction, the 
experience of job insecurity has been associated with ill health. Nevertheless, the previous 
evidence of this association for Spain is scarce and ambiguous. The present investigation 
shows that the conclusions regarding the negative effect of temporary employment on health 
are unambiguous when its impact is measured on an indicator of overall health status, as 
permanent disability, and not restricted to differences in workplace safety.  
 
Regarding differences between immigrants and natives, we find, first of all, that our 
theoretical hypothesis that disability and risk are jointly determined is not valid for 
immigrants. Such is the econometric explanation of the non-significance of the ρ parameter 
for the immigrant population. The conceptual implication is that health considerations play no 
role on determining occupational choice for immigrants. Neither is unmeasured heterogeneity 
–e.g. in time discount rates- simultaneously affecting the risk level choice and the probability 
of disability. A theoretical model in which working conditions have an important role on 
determining health status is obviously valid for immigrants. Nevertheless, the occupational   23
choice cannot be interpreted as an investment in health simply because working conditions 
are not a matter of choice in terms of health.  
 
Moreover, occupational choice seems to mediate the effect of education on disability 
propensities in the case of immigrants
11. While education exerts a significant effect on risk 
level choices for all the groups, its impact on disability is restricted to natives and EU-15, 
American and Canadian immigrants. Education is one of the classical determinants 
socioeconomic inequalities in health. The absence of effect of this variable in the case of 
immigrants when working conditions are included in the model suggests that the relative role 
of education and working conditions  in explaining health  inequalities may have not being 
properly measured yet, or it is changing, and that it requires further investigations.  
 
We have also shown that the impact of working conditions on disability is dissimilar between 
immigrants and natives. This may arise from unmeasured differences in their ability to 
produce safety at work or from unmeasured differences in initial heath status. The lower 
probability of disability in the case of immigrants is coherent with previous findings 
indicating that the healthier are the most likely to migrate. But our results also confirm the 
assimilation hypothesis since  for all the groups of immigrants time since the first affiliation 
increases the probability of disability. 
 
Both Table 3 and Table 4 reveal that immigrants are far from homogeneous. Region of origin 
and not only migrant status is fundamental to explain risk choice. We have seen that marital 
status and family members, commonly used in the literature as indicators of risk preferences, 
                                                 
11 This result is supported by the fact that estimations of the model without including risk as 
determinant of disability show a significant effect of education on disability.   24
have less effect on the probability of choosing risky jobs for immigrants. Moreover, transit 
from unemployment increases the probability to bear risks more in the case of Africans and 
Latin Americans than for native-born Spaniards. These findings can be interpreted as 
confirming that, regarding occupational choices, immigrants are more affected than natives by 
lack of opportunities in the labour market. In addition, the differential effect of the region of 
origin suggests a heterogeneous pattern of occupational choice among the different 
communities of immigrants. We postulate an integration model of immigrants in the local 
labour markets with specialization by country; that is to say, with networks of people from the 
same country playing a central role. It is also reasonable to suppose differences in 
reservations wages among groups. Immigrants that originate from richer countries and enjoy a 
greater degree of skill transferability –EU-15, American and Canadian immigrants- may have 
higher reservation wages. Therefore, everything else equal, they may be less prone to accept 
workplace risks. 
 
Policies aiming at reducing health inequalities among sociodemographic groups are in the 
agenda of most of developed countries. Our results indicate that effective and equitable health 
policies must comprise a full understanding of the role of working conditions on determining 
health differences. Also, a better knowledge of the conditions in which vulnerable groups -
like immigrants- access to safe working conditions may contribute to avoid future health 
inequalities. The strong effect on disability of risk exposure and other forms of precarious 
employment –like temporary jobs- suggest that the actions involved in these policies probably 
must exceed the frame of the traditional occupational health policies.  
   25
Finally, it is necessary to mention the limitations of our investigation. First, our data include 
only insured workers, which exclude irregular labour relations, more likely to happen among 
foreign workers. Second, institutional and bureaucratic requirements to obtain a disability 
pension may affect differently natives and immigrants. The latter may be more likely 
dissuaded to apply for a pension, due to lack of information or specific capabilities. 
Nevertheless, the individuals –also immigrants- included in our sample have been working 
and living in Spain at least for five years, so that the above mentioned limitation is supposed 
to be mitigated. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Non Fatal Injury and Illness Rates by Industry and Occupation (per 100,000 workers) 
MAJOR 
OCCUPATION 







































335.57 0.00  687.55 471.70  800.00  0.00  874.64  1031.81  1308.14  424.27  607.36 
Mining and Quarrying  0.00  0.00  6250.00  3508.77  2739.73  9090.91  0.00  8888.89  11009.17  5050.51  7161.35 
Manufacturing  166.70  116.50 395.55 781.86 517.11 2263.20 406.50  1289.69  1296.58  1252.11  1053.89 
Electricity, gas, steam 
and air conditioning 
supply 
0.00 259.07 423.73 936.77  1346.80  1470.59 444.44  1884.42  1685.39  1754.39  1092.74 
Construction  195.77 47.19  462.25 1057.08  642.17 1264.04 512.58  1136.59  1054.27  965.36  979.34 
Wholesale and retail 
trade, repair of motor 
vehicles 
378,07  0 135,69 0 193,14  2166,06  127,23  575,93  1220,79  992,15  647,85 
Wholesale and retail 
trade, repair of motor 
vehicles 
72,25 196,66  82,3  245,1  333,07  539,81  336,38 929,22  718,42  772,25  524,55 
Wholesale and retail 
trade, repair of motor 
vehicles 
177,62 0  126,58  185,32  261,47  405,41 228  538,82  427,85  402,41  316,01 
Wholesale and retail 
trade, repair of motor 
vehicles 
229.06  189.30 288.97 829.51 347.85 1040.83 339.13  3149.72  1373.18  2060.92  1203.53 
Accommodation and 
food service activities 
0.00 500.00 416.88 273.82 247.26  224.72 447.57 457.31  458.50  875.03  496.34 
Transportation and 
storage 
250.84  292.11 747.76 730.82 342.90  710.48 541.01  1309.48  2959.03  3332.47  1330.05 
Financial and 
insurance activities 
0.00 0.00 77.54  193.30  246.83  297.62  169.08  1702.13  1526.72  1436.78  206.43 
Real state activities  89.53  0.00  151.98  0.00  180.59  193.05  178.66  821.92  653.59  768.74  361.57   33
Information and 
communication 
0.00 127.23 72.67  0.00  141.94 833.33 232.56  255.75  450.45 0.00 124.44 
Professional,scientific 
technical activities  
31.46 96.96  71.07 413.47  244.17 528.75 192.95  1216.74  1212.44  788.74  543.54 
Public Administration 
and Defense 
225.04  302.07 617.92 1324.81  682.77 1409.67 421.12  6672.03  6074.28  2317.00  1744.55 
Education  136.61  175.70 387.35 217.39 328.95  732.22 361.16  1161.44  1219.51  1120.73  373.00 
Human health and 
Social work activities 
181.46  274.33 430.57 463.32 655.90  535.23 422.11  1587.82  1423.71  1412.11  634.60 
Arts, Entertainment 
and Recreation 
426.44 387.60  298.86  0.00  180.10  111.36  410.17  994.04 819.67 738.40 479.51 
Other service activities  0.00  680.27  0.00  458.72  132.10  665.56  507.19  426.23  764.59  797.17  568.44 
Activ. of households  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  626.96  0.00  4724.41  7894.74  3076.92  1561.69 
Occupation  total  163.07  214.25 353.72 619.54 371.19  752.63 335.11  1476.15  1310.53  1229.62  884.93 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
                 DISAGREGGATION OF “IMMIGRANTS” BY REGION/COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 




AFRICA   LATIN  AMERICAN  EUROPE  NON-
EU 15 
EU-15, USA AND 
CANADA 
ASIA   






% S.D.  %  S.D
. 
% S.D. 
N     748.423  710.344    38.079    8.647    12.838   3282  10765    2393   
%     100   94,92   5,08    1.09    1.48  0.45   1.63   0.34   
DEPENDENT VARIABLES                          
  Disability 5,36  0.21  5,48  0.21  2,41  0.21  1.90  13.68  1.02  0.10  1.00  0.10  2.34  0.15  1.10  0.1 
  Risk 30,01  0.44  25,6  0.44  36,1  36.1  37.64  48.45  23.06  0.42  35.27  47.79  19.33  0.39  11.37  31.75 
                          
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS                             
  Age  (mean)  41,73  11.21 41,84  11.13  40,04  9.10 39.96 9.31 40.22 9.27 37.62  8.17  39.86  8.81  40.49  9.48 
  Gender,  Female  39.8  0.49  40,89  0.49  40,54  0.44 21.17 0.40 49.64 0.50 40.13 49.02 44.86  0.50  33.14  0.47 
  Education   0.89    0.89    0.95    0.86    0.90    0.90    0.88    0.94 
   Without  studies  26.79    26,76    27,57    58.25    17.66    22.73    17.46    39.44   
   Primary  37.75    38,06    30,32    22.62    31.57    33.95    34.89    29.11   
   Secondary  29.51    29,33    33,75    15.61    40.20    35.34    37.61    25.52   
   University  5.95    5,85    8,37    3.52    10.57    7.99    10.04    5.93   
  Family members 
(mean) 
1.48 2.37  3.13  1.44  3.59  2.05  4.01  2.38 3.74 2.00             
  Unmarried  12.95 0.34 12.81  0.33  15.52 0.36  16.93  0.37  12.53  0.33  14.20 0.35 18.18 0.38 16.21 36.86 
                          
WORKING CONDITIONS                             
   Temporary 
contract* 
38.05 0.49  37.28  0.48  47.73  0.49 61.13 0.49 48.57 0.50 43.42  0.49  37.81  0.48 40.20  0.49 
    Unemployed  15.66  0.30 15,45 0.30  15,36  0.31  13.75  0.34 9.86 0.30 9.65  0.29  10.12  0.30 4.80  0.21 
   Self-employed  15.80  0.37  16,30  0.37  11,01  0.37  9.97  0.29  13.40  0.34  13.01  0.33  21.02  40.75  35.60  0.48 
    Low-skilled  job  30.00 0.45  28,20  0.45  35,10  0.48 53.67 0.50 35.12 0.47 0.34  0.47  22.69  0.41 26.79  0.44 
    Years since 1st 
affiliation 
16.88 3.68  20.65 10.08  12.31  7.52 12.35 8.18 10.72 7.05 9.67  5.69  15.21  7.27 11.25  6.49 
  Previous working status (%)                               
    Unemployed  21.82 0.38 21,74 0.38  14.92 0.36 16.64 0.37  13.86 0.35 14.69 0.35 16.65 0.37 6.81 0.25 
  Firm  characteristics**                         
   Nr. Employers 
(mean) 
314.56  1312 320,9 1332 236.86 1005  196.08  793,18  310.07  1191  193.10 881 228.77  1026  94.11 518 
   Years since 
foundation 
(mean) 
15,7 16,22 11.78 13.13  15.97 16.37 10.41 11.99  12.00 13.50 11.25 11.96 13.30 13.95 9.75 12.28 
    *Includes  civil  servants                       
    **Only private sector is considered                               35
Table 3. Bivariate Probit Estimation for the whole sample (M1) and with variable 
interactions (M2).   
Variable    
Permanent disability   
   M1  M2   
    Mg. Effects  z    Mg. Effects  z    
Age    0.0019  85.06  **
*
0.0019   83.56  *** 
Female    0.0035  8.70  **
*
0.0017  4.24  *** 
Primary education
$  -0.0048  -13.77  **
*
-0.0055   -16.07  *** 
Secondary education
$  -0.0094  -21.04  **
*
-0.0123  -28.69  *** 
University education
$  -0.0127  -17.21  **
*
-0.0151  -22.93  *** 
Unmarried    0.0026  4.59  **
*
0.0022  3.94  *** 
Family members  -0.0020  -14.06  **
*
-0.0020  -15.32  *** 
Years since 1
st affiliation  0.0430  21.53  **
*
0.0325    21.22  *** 
Years since 1
st affiliation Sq  -0.0006  -17.63  **
*
0.0005  -17.39  *** 
Temporary contract  0.0244  70.33  **
*
0.0219  66.12  *** 
Low skilled job  0.0101  26.17  **
*
0.0096  25.71  *** 
Risk     0.0525  41.62  **
*
0.0470   39.00  *** 
Immigrant    -0.0093  -11.29  **
*
-  -    
Risk*African          -0.0118  -6.12  *** 
Risk*Latin American    -0.0130  -5.15  *** 
Risk* European       -0.0142  -3.59  *** 
Risk* EU15, USA, Canada  -0.0025  -0.98    
Risk*Asia          -0.0060   -0.79     
               
Risk
&        
Age   -0.0135  25.78  **
*
-0.0150  -28.69  *** 
Age squared    0.0001  20.33  **
*
0.0001   22.85  ***  
Female   -0.2261  -212.33  **
*
-0.2252  -217.65  ***  
Primary education
$  -0.0379  -31.73  **
*
-0.0417  -33.74  ***  
Secondary education
$  -0.1565  -125.18  **
*
-0.1662  -131.88  ***  
University education
$  -0.1714  -97.87  **
*
-0.1794  -107.14  ***  
Unmarried   -0.0091  -5.08  **
*
-0.0093  -5.09  ***  
Family members    -0.0015  -3.66  **
*
-0.0013  -3.09  ***  
Unemployed last relation  0.0307  21.29  **
*
0.0370  25.38  ***  
Years since 1
st affiliation  0.0550  25.03  **
*
0.0033  27.77  ***   
Years since 1
st affiliation Sq  -0.0006  -12.45  **
*
0.0007  -14.79  *** 
Immigrant   0.0387  14.65  **
*
-  -     
Africa       0.0587   11.72  *** 
Latin America      0.0648  13.29  *** 
Europe non-EU15    0.1655  18.75  *** 
EU-15, USA, Canada  0.0063   1.45     
Asia       -0.0891   -10.08  *** 
Rho  -0.24    rho   -0.2032   
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0:     chi2(1) =  477.25   Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0:     chi2(1) =380.047  
& We have controlled for firm characteristics (size, years since foundation) 
N Observations  629.863   
Log Likelihood   -360927.9   
Prob > chi2  0.0000  
$ Base category: no studies   
*** Significant at 1% level   
** Significant at 5% level   
* Significant at 10% level   
The marginal effects of the binary variables are calculated as the difference in the average predicted probability  
of a positive outcome for the variable when:(1) variable values are set to zero; and (2) variable values are set to one 
The second column in each model contains the z-statistics refering to the estimated coefficients   36
Table 4. Bivariate probit for native-born Spaniards and Immigrants by region og origin (Marginal Effects)
    
  Spain  Africa    Latin  America  Europe  non- 
EU15 
EU15, USA and 
Canda 
Asia  
Permanent disability                    
Age  0.0021 *** 0.0005  *** 0.0004 *** 0.0003 ** 0.0006 ** 0.0002 * 
  85,09   3.74  4.72  3.32  6.42  1.90  
Famele 0.0032  ***  0.0057  *  0.0013    -0.0035    -0.0025    -0.0018   
  7,59  1.93    0.80   -1.40    -1.40    -0.87   
Primary  education  -0.0050 *** -0.0020    -0.0015    0.0053    -0.0030 * 0.0009   
  -13.39   -0.93    -0.83  1.59  -1.68    0.40   
Secondary education  -0.0097  ***  -0.0069  *** -0.0018    0.0023    -0.0089  **
*
0.0011  
  -20.32   -2.99    -1.04  0.69  -4.19    0.44   
University education  -0.0136  ***  -0.0025    -0.0012    0.0006    -0.0063  **  -0.0019   
  -17.31   -0.55    -0.51  0.10  -2.40    -0.71   
Unmarried  0.0035 *** -0.0017 ** -0.0014    -0.0039    -0.0039 * 0.0030   
  5,76  -2.27    -0.76      -1.54    -1.75    0.79   
Family members  -0.0019  ***  -0.0017  *** -0.0010  **  -0.0002    -0.0025  **
*
0.0002  
  -13.40   -2.97  -2.17  -0.40  -3.64  0.44  
Years since 1st afiliation  0.0019  ***  0.0019  *** 0.0019  ***  0.0003    0.0022  **
*
0.0004  
  17.62   4.04  5.73  0.68  5.14  0.92  
Years since 1st afiliation Sq.  0.0001  ***  0.0001  **  0.0000  ***  0.0000    0.0001  **
*
0.0000  
  -14.81    -2.27    -4.59    0.82      -3.42    0.10   
Temporary contract  0.0259  ***  0.0044  **  0.0043  ***  0.0033    0.0083  **
*
0.0012  
  71.85   2.69  3.33  1.56  4.80  0.69  
Low-skilled  job  0.0102  *** 0.0046 ** -0.0007    0.0098 *** 0.0108 **
*
0.0033  
  25.44    2.39    -0.47     3.25     4.76    1.15   
Risk 0.0542  ***  0.0121  **  0.0172  **  0.0018    0.0140  **
*
0.0046  
  41.45   2.03  2.26  0.36    2.73  0.35  
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Table 4. Continued                    
  Spain  Africa    Latin  America  Europe  non- 
EU15 
EU15, USA and 
Canda 
Asia  
Risk                    
                        
Age  -0.0204 *** 0.0059    0.0100 *** 0.0185 ** 0.0017   0.0017  
  -35.90   1.39  3.33    2.35    0.60  1.46  
Age  squared  0.0002  *** -0.0001    -0.0001 *** -0.0002 **  0.0000    0.0000   
  29,91    -1.66    -1.00     -2.30    -1.28      -1.21   
Female  -0.2224 *** -0.3197 *** -0.2659 *** -0.3471 *** -0.1686 **
*
-0.0183 **
*   208.55  -22.81  -3.38   -21.17  -26.82  -5.74  
Primary education
$  -0.0423 *** -0.0079    -0.0215 **  0.0211    -0.0218 **
*
-0.0020  
  -33.34  -21.07    -33.46    0.95  -2.92  -0.56  
Secondary  education  -0.1661 *** -0.1340 *** -0.0736 *** -0.0563 ** -0.1138 **
*
-0.0088 ** 
  -127.49    -0.51    -2.47    -2.55    -14.88      -2.42   
University  education  -0.1799 *** -0.1975 *** -0.1073 *** -0.1390 *** -0.1100 **
*
-0.0131 ** 
  -102.90   -7.42    -8.28    -4.47    -13.73  -2.32  
Years since 1st afiliation  0.0148  ***  -0.0061  *  0.0150  ***  -0.0001  ***  0.0006    0.0031  **
*   35.88  -1.81  -7.77  -3.67  0.39   -2.99   
Years since 1st afiliation Sq.  0.0002  ***  0.0001  *  0.0003  ***  -0.0245  ***  0.0000  *  0.0001  ** 
  -22.88    1.71    6.64    -4.10    1.91     2.66    
Unmarried -0.0108  ***  -0.0310    -0.0118    0.0237  ***  -0.0014    0.0207  **
*   -5.76  1.14  5.79   2.9    -0.14    3.11   
Family  members  -0.0025 *** 0.0015    0.0051 *** 0.0141 ** 0.0063 **  0.0008  
  -5.53    3.97    3.93    2.57      2.86      1.05    
Unemployed last relation  0.0360  ***  0.0681  *** 0.0425  ***  0.0059    0.0222  **
*
-0.0060  
  24.05   0.47  2.66    0.23    2.56   -1.08   
                        
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: 
chi2(1) =   
491.62  0.0290    1.5578  0.6750      1.2218    0.0389   
  -0.25    -0.02    -0.21     -0.17    -0.10     0.12   
N  Observations  598299   6894  9311  2815   10269    2115   
Log Likelihood  -347910.64    -4241.46    -3991.30    -1349.91    -4577.93    -623.57   
Wald chi2 (26)       1229.14    1393.22    707.02    1675.15    560.75   
$ Base category: no studies   
& We have controlled for firm characteristics (size, years since foundation)   
*** Significant at 1% level   
** Significant at 5% level    
* Significant at 10% level    